Experts

  • Mark I. Levy, MD, DLFAPA
    Medical Director, Forensic Psychiatrist, Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (Psychiatry) with Added Qualifications in Forensic Psychiatry, Distinguished Life Fellow American Psychiatric Association
  • Sarah A. Hall, PhD
    Adult, Child & Adolescent Forensic Neuropsychologist
  • David Y. Kan, MD
    Forensic Psychiatrist, Addiction Medicine & Substance Abuse Specialist, Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (Psychiatry) with Added Qualifications in Forensic Psychiatry
  • Anlee Kuo, MD, JD
    Child and Adolescent Forensic Psychiatrist, Diplomate American Board of Psychiatry & Neurology (Psychiatry), Board Eligible for Child, Adolescent and Forensic Psychiatry
  • Ronald Roberts, PhD
    Board Certified in Forensic Psychology, American Board of Professional Psychology, American College of Law and Psychology
  • Charles Saldanha, MD
    Forensic Psychiatrist, Acute Care and Emergency Psychiatry, Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (Psychiatry) with Added Qualifications in Forensic Psychiatry

Reference Material

Psychiatric "Fitness for Duty" Evaluations

Fitness for Duty Evaluation can provide concrete information about an employee’s level of functioning and appropriateness for their work environment. By requesting a Fitness for Duty Evaluation, an employer demonstrates good faith in attempting to resolve potentially contentious and litigious workplace situations.

Forensic psychiatrists and psychologists can provide concrete information regarding employees’ abilities, risk factors, and assist in planning for return to work. Typically, a Fitness for Duty Evaluation requires an extended interview between the employee and the doctor. On most occasions, the evaluation will include psychological testing beyond the face-to-face evaluation. The evaluation will cover background information, salient issues that led to the request for the evaluation, mental status, risk factors, and review of treatment to date. In addition, our doctors typically consult with the employer and/or other important "collateral" sources of information about employees’ behavior.

When appropriate, collateral information may be sought from employers (job description, personnel record) and with the employee's permission from treating psychiatrists and psychologists.

Employers should consider Fitness for Duty Evaluation when they observe any of the following behavior from employees:

  • Threat of violence
  • Impaired concentration
  • Paranoid thinking
  • Abusive behavior toward co-workers or customers
  • Anxiety, depression, unexplained change in behavior, decreased efficiency, drug and alcohol use.

The California Confidential of Medical Information Act (CMIA) Civil Code Section 56, et seq.

by Bill Hadden and Robert Wexler

The most prominent sources of authority for fitness for duty issues are the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) Civil Code Section 56, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)42 U.S.C. '12101, et seq.  They will be discussed in order. 

I.          CMIA PROVISIONS 

The CMIA sets forth limitations on the dissemination of private medical information.  Section 56.10(a) states: "No provider of health care shall disclose medical information regarding a patient of the provider without first obtaining an authorization, except as provided in subdivision (b) or (c)." 

Section 56.10(b) delineates seven circumstances in which a provider of health care shall disclose medical information, such as when the provider is compelled, for example, by court order or by the lawful issuance of process of a board, commission, administrative agency, arbitrator or governmental agency. 

Section 56.10(c), subsection (8) is the part of the statute most applicable to employer requested fitness for duty examinations.  It reads as follows: 

(c)  A provider of health care may disclose medical information as follows: 

(A) Is relevant in a lawsuit, arbitration, grievance, or other claim or challenge to which the employer and the employee are parties and in which the patient has placed in issue his or her medical history, mental or physical condition, or treatment, provided it may only be used or disclosed in connection with that proceeding. 

(B) Describes functional limitations of the patient that may entitle the patient to leave from work for medical reasons or limit the patient's fitness to perform his or her present employment, provided that no statement of medical cause is included in the information disclosed.

The disclosure of any information by the health care provider to an employer beyond that allowed under subsection (c)(8) requires specific written authorization by the patient to the medical provider (Section 56.11), or to the employer (Section 56.21).  An employee shall not be discriminated against in terms or conditions of employment due to a refusal to sign an authorization, pursuant to Section 56.20(b). 

The case of Pettus v. Cole 49 Cal.App.4th 402, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 (1996) provides a detailed examination of the application of Section 56.10.  That case concerned a 22-year employee of the DuPont Corporation, who sought to take time off from work because of a disabling stress-related condition. After two non-employer doctors recommended that Pettus' condition warranted a disability leave, Pettus was required to submit to a company doctor, pursuant to DuPont's short-term disability leave policy.  DuPont's doctors told the employer that Pettus' stress condition might have been caused or exacerbated by his misuse of alcohol.  DuPont required that Pettus enter into a rehab program as a condition of employment, and when he refused, terminated him.  Among the issues presented for legal review was the propriety of DuPont's doctors revealing the detailed circumstances of Pettus' interviews with them, as well as that of DuPont's disciplinary action based upon such interviews.  In short, the court found that the doctors had violated Section 56.10(c)(8) in revealing information far beyond that allowed by that Section.  Furthermore, the court found that DuPont could not compel Pettus' attendance in a rehab program under penalty of termination, as employees alone are vested with the decision-making process relating to their own health care. 

In Pettus, DuPont alleged that Section 56.10 did not protect Pettus because he did not qualify as a "patient" within the meaning of this statute, and that DuPont's doctors were not "providers of health care" under the circumstances.  The court rejected both contentions, finding that, not withstanding that Pettus received no treatment from DuPont's doctors, Pettus still qualified as a "patient" pursuant to the definitions in the Act and that DuPont, by generating "medical information" met the statutory definition of a "provider of health care".   As stated by the Pettus court: 

The Legislature clearly intended for the statute to afford employees in Pettus' situation, i.e., where the employer has requested and paid for medical examinations to determine the validity of a claim for medical leave benefits - some protection by imposing a duty on health care providers involved in the procedure a duty to maintain, at least to a limited degree, the confidentiality of the employee's medical information. . . . Indeed, subdivision (c)(8)(B) expressly refers to an employee who is examined by health care provider, at the employer's request and expense, as a "patient."  (Pettus, at 57 Cal.Rptr.2d, 64-65) 

Section 56.16, however, permits health care providers to discuss general medical information about a patient without his or her consent, unless the patient provides the physician with a specific written request to the contrary.  The California Court of Appeal, in Garrett v. Young, (2 Dist, 2003) 109 Cal.App 4th 1393, 1 Cal.Rptr. 3d 134, recently upheld a decision dismissing an employee’s action against her physician for invasion of privacy and violation of the CMIA, despite the fact the employee advised her doctor verbally not to share any information with her employer.  The Court noted that the legislature’s intent in enacting the CMIA was “to permit disclosure of general information without imposing burdensome paperwork or administrative requirements on medical providers, which could too easily lead to technical violations of the Act and litigation over inconsequential disclosures.”  The Court refused to read into the statute a formal requirement that physicians notify patients that general medical information may be freely discussed.  Instead, after conducting a thorough review of the history of Section 56.16, the Court reasoned that the Legislature intended the burden to be on the patient to provide a written notice to the doctor that he is prohibited from disclosing even general information.  Any expectation that “busy physicians should be expected to recall oral instructions not to speak to a specific party, such as an employer, was not reasonable under the statute.” 

II.         A.D.A. REQUIREMENTS

The protections of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) prevent an employer from:

a. Requiring a medical examination; or

b. Inquiring as to whether an employee has a disability; or

c. Inquiring as to the nature or severity of any disability; UNLESS

d. The inquiry or examination is "job related and consistent with business necessity". (42 USC Section 12112(c)(4)(A)) 

The purpose of these restrictions is to prevent the administration to employees of medical tests or inquiries that do not serve a legitimate business purpose.   

Conversely, the EEOC in interpreting the ADA has recognized that an employer may make some medical inquiries and require fitness for duty exams.  However, the employer's inquiries are limited to inviting employees to indicate whether they have a disability, and to what extent.  The employee may not be compelled to reveal a disability to the employer.  Where an employee voluntarily discloses the disability or other medical information, the employer will not be held deemed to have violated the Act, but the employer is restricted from requesting, persuading, coercing or otherwise pressuring the individual to obtain such disclosure. 

III.            COMMON QUESTIONS 

We will now apply the above background to answer some of the most common questions relating to fitness for duty matters. 

A. If I don't sign any waiver form, what information is the doctor allowed to give to my department? 

Based on Section 56.10(c)(8)(B), the doctor may only provide sufficient information to say whether you are fit for duty, and to describe any functional limitations.  The doctor would be precluded from providing any statement of medical cause.  For example, the doctor may tell the department that an officer cannot presently handle the stress of patrol duties, but may not tell the department that the officer is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. 

B. Is there a traditional doctor-patient relationship with the fitness for duty doctor? 

No, but this does not mean that there is no confidentiality as to the information you provide to the doctor, as long as you do not provide any additional authorization to release your medical information.  Under the CMIA, a doctor is limited as to what information can be revealed to the employer and the doctor has no authorization under the statute to reveal the information to any other parties, except under very limited circumstances. 

C. Do I have to sign any authorization or waiver form in the doctor's office?

No.  There should be no need for you to sign any such form, as the doctor may reveal to the department a statement of your fitness and functional limitations without any authorization pursuant to Section 56.10(c)(8)(B).  In addition, you may not be discriminated against in terms or conditions of employment due to your refusal to sign an authorization form (Civil Code Section 56.20(b)).  Sadly, we have found numerous doctors performing fitness for duty examinations who entice an already emotionally disadvantaged officer to sign a detailed waiver, attempting to limit the doctor's liability and allow the doctor to communicate any part of the examination to anyone that the doctor may choose.  Most of these "authorizations" that we have seen are unlawful, as failing to meet the detailed statutory requirements for a waiver set forth in Civil Sections 56.11 and 56.21.  Remember, virtually all the information your department needs can be communicated without your waiver.  Signing a waiver form will only allow the release of more private information, which in most circumstances will be unnecessary. 

D. Is there any time when I will want to sign an authorization form? 

It is possible that an employee may wish to share more information with his or her department about his or her medical condition so that a department can better provide reasonable accommodation to that employee in accordance with the provisions of the ADA  However, any employee contemplating the signing of an authorization, waiver, etc., should contact legal counsel before doing so.   

E. Is my statement to the doctor considered a compelled statement that cannot be used against me for any criminal purpose? 

An order that directs an employee to discuss his psychological state during a fitness for duty examination would appear to qualify as a compelled statement in accordance with the standards set forth in Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, such that the statement could not be used against the employee for any criminal purpose.  However, as an exercise of caution, employees should request that the department provide a written order to cooperate in the fitness for duty examination, so that the compulsory nature of the discussion with the doctor is firmly established. 

This article is intended to provide general guidance to those subject to fitness for duty exams and cannot comprehensively address every issue.  However, involved officers should always avail themselves of the opportunity to contact legal counsel before attending the exam to make sure that their rights are best protected. 

About the Authors:   Bill Hadden and Robert Wexler are partners in the Santa Monica law firm of Silver, Hadden and Silver, which has specialized in representing public safety associations and their members for over 30 years.

Return to topic index

Vexatious Litigants - Litigants Who Won't Accept "No" (or "Yes") for an Answer

By Mark I. Levy MD, DLFAPA

Vexatious litigants[1] are individuals who burden the judicial process by repeatedly filing causes of action that are ultimately found to be without merit. Despite the considerable cost to the judicial system (and ultimately to society) little has been written about vexatious litigation and less has been done to understand the psychological motivations for vexatious litigation in order to better manage the problem. This is partly because in a constitutional democracy everyone is deemed to be "entitled to his (or her) day in court." The federal and state constitutions within the United States jealously protect citizens' right to submit their grievances to our judicial systems in order to resolve civil disputes in a timely and equitable manner. At the same time, the Court, already overburdened with the shear volume of litigation, is charged the responsibility to protect the integrity of our judicial system from abuse by a very small but very troublesome minority of litigants.

Internationally, notably few jurisdictions have attempted to formally address this problem(the exceptions being Australia, The United Kingdom and the State of California). Within the United States, only California has enacted statutory regulation of vexatious litigation.[2]

Forensic psychiatry is a subspecialty of the medical specialty of psychiatry that focuses upon the interface between law and the behavioral sciences. Since 1994, The American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology has offered qualified board certified psychiatrists the opportunity to be examined and if successful to obtain board certification in forensic psychiatry in addition to their certification in adult and/or child and adolescent psychiatry.

Like law, the profession of forensic psychiatry is practically divided between criminal and civil domains. Although there are many common elements between law and the practice of forensic psychiatry within civil and criminal matters, there are also several important differences. Within civil law, vexatious litigation has increasingly been recognized by the judiciary as a difficult problem to manage. Since vexatious litigants frequently represent themselves in propria persona, at least during some of the actions that they attempt to litigate, and since the judiciary has a responsibility to be more accommodating and helpful to such litigants who are not represented by licensed counsel, there Court is faced with a complex dilemma once it becomes apparent that a "pro per" litigant is in fact vexatious.

Only recently, however, have forensic psychiatrists begun to examine the motivations and possible psychopathology driving the litigious behavior of this individuals. The Courts' need to more effectively manage and legislatures' to more effectively regulate individuals who exhibit this problematical behavior. In order to assist the judiciary (as well as the legal profession) to more easily recognize the characteristics individuals fitting this profile, forensic psychiatrists and psychologists need to study and understand more fully the dynamics and motivations for this socially costly and troublesome behavior. This paper is an attempt to examine this infrequently explored terrain.

A triad of behavioral characteristics are frequently demonstrated by vexatious litigants:

1. A history of changing counsel more than once, coupled with at least one episode of representing themselves in Court in propria persona. Not surprisingly, competent counsel generally find a means to ethically remove themselves from the case after a period of poor client control. Sooner or later, usually after a time of appearing "pro per," these litigants find counsel who more or less identify with their client, presumably for reasons having to do with their own personal psychology. The result of this is an attorney-client dyad that is driven by a mission. No client control exists nor is it even recognized by plaintiff's counsel as lacking. Hence no settlement can ever occur.

2. Evidence of narcissistic and paranoid personality traits, obtained from psychiatric examination and psychological testing. These traits are generally manifested by attitudes expressed verbally or behaviorally (e.g., through physical appearance) conveying that the individual considers himself to be an exception, i.e., that the normal rules of behavioral conduct within a judicial process to which all litigants are expected to submit uniquely do not apply to him because he is allegedly special, having suffered abuse, humiliation and/or victimization unduly at the hands of alleged perpetrators, including judges, thereby entitling the vexatious litigant to exceptional status and accommodation by the Court. Not infrequently, although the source of alleged abuse is initially the defendant in a civil action, eventually the Court itself is drawn into this "dance" and is experienced from a paranoid perspective by the litigant, as itself also an abuser. Invariably, this is due to the Court attempting to impose a modicum of decorum on behavior of the litigant by invoking normal procedural requirements. As a result of this transformation of the Court, in the litigant's mind, from arbitrator to oppressor, the Court's responses may eventually be perceived as more persecutory and humiliating than was the alleged conduct of the original defendant.

3. A refusal to settle disputes through customary procedural channels of negotiation and even traditional litigation. These individuals wish to have their alleged suffering, humiliation and victimization witnessed on the stage of litigation. Their common fantasy is that unspecified "others" (the jury, initially the Court itself) will sympathize with suffering and offer some sort of illusoryl vindication and redemption. Consequently, not only do they characteristically refuse to accept negative judicial decisions, sometimes they will reject decisions in their own favor, if they believe that acceptance will terminate the litigation and their chances to obtain the imagined vindication. Although this may superficially appear to be perverse, it is in fact a direct product of their peculiar motivation to litigate in the first place, i.e., to have their alleged victimization witnessed, not to resolve conflict. Of course, such motivation leads to an endless quest because no degree of witnessing and acknowledgment of their pain can ever approach the unconditional love for which they long and thus "restore" the wounded narcissism and damaged self esteem of these individuals. If permitted to do so, they will attempt to appeal trial court decisions to the highest judicial levels.

Judicial Dilemma:

The judicial dilemma is to balance the rights of the individual to have his "day in Court" with the pressure to assure that justice for all is administered in a timely and expeditious manner by keeping judicial calendars moving and trying to urge disputing parties to utilize alternative methods of conflict resolution, To further complicate the task, as a result of a series of revisions of codes of judicial oversight and the evolution of commissions on judicial conduct during recent decades, trial court judges are charged with balancing their judicial demeanor with the requirement that they maintain decorum within the courtroom. When confronted by the behavior of a vexatious litigant, who behaves in a manner signifying that they are an exception to the usual rules of the Court, balancing judicial demeanor with courtroom decorum can present a formidable judicial challenge.

Two instances of where this complex dynamic can strain the litigation management skills of even the most experienced judge include civil cases brought by vexatious litigants and the emotionally charged disputes, including custody matters,  that are brought before a Family Court. In the former instance, as already mentioned, the litigant vehemently resists normal judicial suggestion and even the requirement that they engage in good faith in a process of alternative conflict resolution. Such efforts are perceived by these litigants as a threat to sustaining the ongoing litigation process which, as described above, for the vexatious litigant is an end unto itself. In the latter instance, custody battles and parental misconduct allegations are often presented in the service of punishing the other party. In the extreme, it is not unknown in family court for even a spousal batterer to attempt to highjack the Court proceedings as a way to continue their domination and victimization of their abused spouse.


[1] Vexatious litigation is legal action which is brought, regardless of its merits, solely to harass or subdue an adversary. It may take the form of a primary frivolous lawsuit or may be the repetitive, burdensome, and unwarranted filing of meritless motions in a matter which is otherwise a meritorious cause of action. It is considered an abuse of the judicial process and almost always brings down sanctions on the offender.

[2] Under California law (Code of Civil Procedure, section 391(b)) a vexatious litigant is someone in at least one of the following categories:

1. In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing.

2. After a litigation has been finally determined against the person, (he or she) repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined.

3. In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.

4. Has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence.

Return to topic index

Vexatious Litigant - example

Woman who sues at drop of hat may get hers

Ken Garcia    Tuesday, June 6, 2000
©2000 San Francisco Chronicle

SAN FRANCISCO -- The legal establishment may never completely catch up with Patricia A. McColm, but the karmic circle is closing in fast.

Because if time truly wounds all heels, McColm's number is just a few ticks away from coming up. And her departure from her abode near City College will mark a day of celebration for her neighbors and a large portion of the local court system, where Ms. McColm has made herself into a local, if unwanted, legend.

For those who haven't had the pleasure of being introduced to McColm, let me do the honors. She is the city's most infamous vexatious litigant -- a person who has sued so many people and agencies and businesses so many times that the courts ruled she could not bring another frivolous lawsuit without permission.

It didn't stop sweet Patty from trying, mind you -- she did manage to sue one neighbor for ``civil conspiracy'' recently and got a temporary restraining order against another prohibiting him from opening and shutting a side door. But now she's running from the law as much as she's pursuing it, and it's tough even for the Road Runner to speed in two directions at the same time.

Some of her neighbors were all but set to throw a block party when they found out that on Friday, the mortgage company that holds the note on her house was scheduled to have a foreclosure sale. It seems that the Witch of Westwood Park had not made any mortgage payments for nearly two years and was in arrears to the tune of $90,000.

Somehow, Patty managed to stave off the foreclosure sale another few weeks by filing another Chapter 11 brief, and sure enough, on Sunday, there was her house of horrors on Miramar Avenue advertised in the paper for $875,000, the scariest part being the line about ``for sale by owner.''

Having the uninitiated show up at McColm's door is kind of like walking in on Tony Perkins at the Bates Motel. You might survive the encounter, but it will haunt you for the rest of your life.

``I went out there just thinking it was a routine claim, when I encountered the most abusive, profane person I've ever met in my life,'' said insurance investigator Vic Pence, who handled a claim filed by McColm for water damage due to a leaky roof. ``Most people don't realize until it's too late that if you have the smallest dealing with her that you end up in the battle of your life.''

Mysteriously, just a few months after she had a new roof put on, someone managed to climb onto McColm's roof and drill and saw enough holes in it to let the water pour in. McColm naturally blamed her conspiratorial neighbors. Pence said the insurance company has ruled out that theory and has strong suspicions about how the holes got there, but the claim is still pending.

Still pending might be a good way to describe many of the legal adventures in McColm's past, but at least a few have been resolved. And you could bet the house, hers or yours, that more will follow.

In the past two decades, McColm has sued the federal government, the Bank of America, Kaiser, at least three department stores, a host of city workers, numerous private businesses, tenants, and at least two newspapers that printed articles about her. And when I called her yesterday to talk to her about the foreclosure sale and other matters, she told me she will sue me as well.

Like I say, she's consistent.

After she was denied tenure at San Francisco State University, she filed suit contending sex discrimination. When she failed the state bar the second time, she sued the state bar.

She has sued contractors. She has sued churches. She has sued people for unseen injuries she claimed to have incurred in at least nine car accidents. And she has sued her neighbors so many times that they could form their own support group, if they weren't so busy scrambling to retain legal counsel.

One poor neighbor, 27-year-old David Greenbaum, has been hounded by McColm for almost two decades, since she first filed a lawsuit to stop him and his brothers from playing basketball in their backyard. That suit lingered in the courts for eight years, and ended with McColm getting a nice little settlement of $5,000 from an insurance company. She recently filed a fresh ``civil conspiracy'' suit against him.

The last time I saw McColm she was in court fighting charges by the city that she ripped off renters at her house by demanding outrageous cash advances and then keeping the money after she terrorized them and all but forced them to leave. On more than one occasion, her tenants required police protection when they moved out.

She was finally forced to stop renting out rooms, but there's just no stopping McColm. If there is a loophole she will find it, if there's an angle, she will play it, and if there's a target, she will sue it.

That will help explain how McColm has managed to stay in her home despite having made no payments on it in almost two years, and how at the last minute, she managed to stave off the foreclosure sale and obviously hopes to sell her house in the interim and walk away with a tidy chunk of change.

There are a number of liens on her property due to claims filed by numerous contractors who say they worked on her house with a 10 percent deposit and are still waiting for the other 90 percent. The poor saps never knew anything about McColm until it was too late, but if they have any hope of ever seeing another penny, then their faith knows no bounds.

Just ask Mark Balisteri, who had the misfortune of moving into the property next to McColm's in October. Because of McColm's history, real estate agents were required to prepare packets of newspaper clippings and other information disclosing her history of legal abuse against her neighbors. Balisteri said he read it all -- and yet still believed he could just avoid her.

``You could read all that information and still not realize how unreasonable that woman is,'' he said. ``I thought, my wife and I don't have any kids, our dog doesn't bark, we could just never deal with her. We didn't think it could possibly be that bad.''

Think again. When he filed a permit to do some minor work on his house, McColm appealed it. Tied it up for months. Then she filed a harassment lawsuit against him claiming that he was slamming his side door to bother her. A judge, weary of her presence in his courtroom, granted a temporary restraining order barring the use of the door during certain hours, though it was later dismissed.

A lawyer for the mortgage company said McColm's attempts to stop the foreclosure sale are fairly routine and that she was ``entitled to her day in court.'' We had a good laugh over that one.

But Patty isn't laughing and her neighbors aren't celebrating. Not yet. Not when a lawsuit is just a phone call, or a ball bounce, or a church bell ring away.

For you can sue to stop church bells from ringing. But halting time is another matter -- and not one that can be settled by the courts.

You can reach Ken Garcia at (415) 777-7152, fax him at (415) 896-1107, or send him an e-mail note at garciak@sfgate.com.

   · Printer-friendly version
· Email this article to a friend

  Rec-Park Chief Can Save Game - Babe Ruth league getting short s...
06/10/2000

Pillar Of Power Flexes Muscle - Demonstration of clout stuns ne...
06/08/2000

Harridan's Spiteful Grip Weakening - Woman who sues at drop of ...
06/06/2000

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Feedback   
 

Return to topic index

On Wearing Two Hats: Role Conflict in Serving as Both Psychotherapist and Expert Witness

Article by: Larry H. Strasburger, M.D., Thomas G. Gutheil, M.D., and Archie Brodsky, B.A.

Should psychotherapists serve as expert witnesses for their patients? Psychotherapists of all disciplines need to confront the potential clinical, legal, and ethical problems involved in combining the roles of treating clinician and forensic evaluator. As clinicians find themselves drawn into proliferating, often ambiguously defined contacts with the legal system, clarity in role definitions becomes crucial.

Download article (pdf)

Return to topic index

Shrink on the Couch: Deposing Mental Health Experts - PowerPoint

This was a talk presented by Mark Levy MD and Ronald Roberts PhD at Bar Association of San Francisco in September 12, 2007. Download "Deposing Mental Health Experts" powerpoint.pdf

Return to topic index

Assessing the Truth: How Forensic Psychiatrists & Psychologists Evaluate Litigants

Forensic psychiatrist Mark Levy MD and forensic neuropsychologist Ronald Roberts, PhD co-authored an article for San Francisco Attorney Magazine, Spring, May 2008. In it, they explain the process and methods used by forensic behavioral experts when conducting an evaluation of an individual as part of a legal proceeding. Download a pdf version of the article here.

Return to topic index

Deposing Mental Health Experts on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

Chapter 716, Lawyers' Guide to Medical Proof, Volume 4
edited by Marshall Houts, J.D., LexisNexis Mathew Bender
2002  Mark I. Levy MD co-author

Download Deposing_MH_Experts.pdf

Return to topic index

The "Eggshell Plaintiff" Revisited: Causation of Mental Damages in Civil Litigation

The Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter
by Mark I. Levy, MD, FAPA and Saul E. Rosenberg, PhD

Download EggshellPlaintiff.pdf

Return to topic index

The Stigma of Mental Illness in the United States

By Mark I. Levy, M.D.

America today is plagued with a pandemic prejudice against those suffering with mental illness that is crippling our nation. Our society equates mental illness with moral weakness, causing individuals to deny their mental suffering out of fear that they will appear to be morally culpable for it.  In so doing, we are telling these individuals that they are inadequate and not meeting socially acceptable standards

We don't moralize about physical pain.  For example, when someone has a broken leg, we don't advise him to, "Shake it off."  Yet, if the same individual describes his symptoms of depression, we encourage him to, "Get out and exercise...pull yourself up by your bootstraps...you'll get over it."  Such advice is useless, inappropriate and blames the sufferer for his illness.

Rather than give in to the great desire to deny the disability caused by mental illness, we need to acknowledge that mental illness is just as valid as physical illness.  We need to view emotional symptoms with the same clinical, objective manner as physical symptoms.  Only then, can we reach out to provide the treatment that will help those suffering and aid them to become contributing members of our society.

Face the Facts of Mental Illness

No. of Americans Suffering from Mental Illness

  • As many as 80 percent of people suffering from mental illnesses can effectively return to normal, productive lives if they receive appropriate treatment.
  • During any one-year period, up to 50 million Americans, more than 22 percent, suffer from a clearly diagnosable mental disorder involving a degree of incapacity that interferes with employment, attendance at school or daily life.

Cost of Mental Illness to Society

  • The direct costs of support and medical treatment of mental illnesses total $55.4 billion a year.
  • The indirect costs, such as lost employment, reduced productivity, criminal activity, vehicular accidents and social welfare programs increase the total cost of mental and substance abuse disorders to more than $273 billion a year.

Efficacy of Treatment for Mental Disorders

  • Medications relieve acute symptoms of schizophrenia in 80 percent of cases, but only about half of all people with schizophrenia seek treatment.
  • With therapy, 80 to 90 percent of the people suffering from depressive disorders can get better, but fewer than one-third of those suffering seek treatment.
  • Refinements of lithium carbonate, used in treating manic-depressive (bipolar) disorder, have led to an estimated annual savings of $8 billion in treatment costs and lost productivity associated with bipolar disorder.
  • Studies of psychotherapy by the National Institute of Mental Health have shown it to be very effective in treating mild to moderate depression.

Statistics gathered from the American Psychiatric Association's web site: www.psych.org.

To interview Dr. Lamia on the topic of social interaction and radio talk shows or Dr. Levy regarding the stigma of mental illness in our society, please call Mary Tressel, Media Consultant, at 925-686-2958.

News Room is published as a service to the media by the San Francisco Foundation for Psychoanalysis.

Scientific Editor: Mark Levy, M.D. (415) 388-8040

Executive Director: Sandra Schaaf (415) 563-6065

Managing Editor: Mary Tressel (925) 686-2958

Return to topic index

Overcoming Obstacles to the Independent Examination of Emotional Damages Defense

Comment
Spring 2004
by Saul Rosenberg, PhD & Mark Levy, MD

Download OvercomingObstacles.pdf

Return to topic index